Abstract. We prove that, if the initial knowledge of the intruder is given by a deterministic bottom-up tree automaton, then the insecurity problem for cryptographic protocols with atomic keys for a bounded number of sessions is NP-complete. We prove also that if regural languages (given by tree automata) are used in protocol descriptions to restrict the form of messages, then the insecurity problem is NexpTime-complete. Furthermore, we define a class of cryptographic protocols, called regular protocols, such that the knowledge which the intruder can gain during an unlimited number of sessions of a protocol is a regular language.
Introduction
Formal verification of cryptographic protocols has been attracting much attention in the recent years (see [10, 4] for an overview). It has been very succesful in finding flaws in cryptographic protocols. Althout the general verification problem is undecidable [6, 1, 7] , there are interesting and important decidable variants [5, 6, 13, 2] . One of them is the insecurity problem of protocols analyzed w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions, in presence of the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder, which is NP-complete [13] . In this case, one assumes that the initial knowledge of the intruder is a finite set of terms.
In this paper, we prove the decidability of security for bounded number of sessions, when the initial knowledge of the intruder is a regular language, with the assumption that keys used in protocols are atomic. We show that if the initial knowledge of the intruder is given by a deterministic bottom-up tree automaton, then the existence of an attack remains NP-complete.
A regular language which represents the initial knowledge of the intruder can be an approximation or an exact representation of the set of messages which could have been intercepted during an unbounded number of prior executions of some protocols. In fact, approximating the knowledge of the intruder by means of finite tree automata or similar formalisms has been studied by several authors (see e.g. [9, 11] ). As a complementary result we define also a class of cryptographic protocols, called regular protocols, such that the exact knowledge which the intruder can gain during an unbounded number of sessions of a protocol is a regular language given by an alternating tree automaton of polynomial size w.r.t. the size of the protocol. The security problem for such protocols is DexpTimecomplete. As an immediate consequence we obtain also an NexpTime algorithm for deciding protocols which consist of two phases: in the first one, only regular rules can be used, these rules can be, however, executed an unbounded number of times. Then, in the second phase, non-regular rules (i.e. rules of an arbitrary form as long as they have atomic keys) can be used a fixed number of times.
We extend also our decidability result to protocols which regular constraints, i.e. protocols which impose some well-formness constraints on messages that can be sent. In [13] , a receive-send action of a principal is described by a rewrite rule t → s (where t, s are terms). The meaning of such a rule is that a principal after receiving any ground instance tθ of t (for any ground substitution θ), replies sθ. It is impossible to model the behaviour of a principal who replies only if the term tθ has some form which cannot be expressed by patern matching (e.g. if tθ is list of encrypted messages). Protocols with regular constraints allow us to express required form of messages by constraints of the form x ∈ L, where L is a regular language (given by some tree automaton). Such constraints may express some integrity requirements. For instance, a checksum for a message m can be simulated by a term f (m) (where f is a new function symbol), which can be adequate, if checksums are collision-free. This approach can be however inadequate, when weak checksums (in which, given a checksum of a message, it is possible to produce another message that evaluates to the same checksum) are considered. Modeling the set { m, c | c is the checksum of m} by a regular language, and using regular constraints can give more precise results.
We show that the insecurity problem of protocols with regular constraints, and with the initial knowledge of the intruder given by finite tree automata is NexpTime-complete (it is NexpTime-hard, when the used automata are deterministic, and remains in NexpTime even for alternating tree automata).
In this paper, we make the following abstractions. We use the Dolev-Yao model of the intruder [5] , which is a standard practice in formal verification of cryptographic protocols. We formulate protocols in the rule-based model used in [2, 3, 13] . In the case of regular protocols, where unbounded number of sessions is considered, this model cannot express fresh nonces which have to be replaced by constants (or some other terms). It implies that some false attacks can be found. It should be mentioned, that this approach is also quite standard, since verification of protocols with nonces is undecidable even in the restricted case, where the size of messages is bounded.
Related work. The security problem of protocols when the initial knowledge of the intruder is given by finite automata has not been considered so far. Similarly, there are no previous decidability results for protocols with regular constraints.
There are, however, many results related to regular protocols defined in Sect. 5. Regular protocols are a generalization of regular unary-predicate programs proposed in [8] . They are also closely related to a class of monadic Horn theories defined in [14] . Our regular protocols are more general than the class H1 defined in [12] . In [1] , the authors specify a class of protocols (without nonces, and satisfying so called independence condition) which is DexpTime-hard. Regular protocols are also more general than this class.
Structure of the paper. Sect. 2 contains some basic definitions. In Sect. 3, we prove that the insecurity problem for bounded number of sessions, when the initial intruder knowledge is given by a deterministic tree automaton is NP-complete. Sect. 4 contains complexity results for protocols with regular constraints. In Sect. 5, we define regular protocols, and prove their properties.
Preliminaries
Terms and term-DAGs. Let T (Σ, V ) denote the set of terms over the signature Σ and the set of variables V . If V = ∅, then we can write T (Σ) instead of T (Σ, V ). A term is ground, if it does not contain variables. A (ground) substitution is a mapping from variables to (ground) terms, which, in a natural way, is extended to a mapping from term to terms.
For a given signature Σ, a term-dag D is a labelled directed acyclic ordered graph such that, if a node v is labelled with a function symbol f of arity n, then it has n ordered immediate successors v 1 , . . . , v n . In such a case we
Unary definite logic programs. Let Σ be a signature, V be a set of variables, and P be a set of predicate symbols (we assume here that all predicates are unary). If p ∈ P , and t ∈ T (Σ, V ), then p(t) is an atomic formula. An atomic formula p(t) is ground, if t is ground. A unary definite logic program is a finite set of clauses of the form a 0 ← a 1 , . . . , a n , where a 0 , . . . , a n are atomic formulas.
We will use the following notation. Let P be a unary definite logic program, let A, B be sets of ground atomic formulas. We write A P B, if there exists a proof of B with respect to P assuming A, i.e. a sequence a 1 , . . . , a n of atomic formulas such that each element of B occurs in a 1 , . . . , a n , and, for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have either (i) a i ∈ A, or (ii) there exists a clause b 0 ← b 1 , . . . , b m in P , and a substitution θ such that a i = b 0 θ, and each of
For a set of atomic formulas A, and an atomic formula a, we write A P a for A P {a}. We write also P B for ∅ P B. It is easy to show that A P a, if and only if a is in the least Herbrand Model of P ∪ A.
Messages, protocols, and intruder. Messages are ground terms over the signature Σ consisting of constants (atomic messages such as principal names, nonces, keys), and the following binary function symbols: ·, · (pairing) {·} · (symmetric encryption), and {·} p · (public key encryption), with the restriction that keys used in public key encryption are constants, i.e. that a term of the form {t} p s is valid only if s is a constant. We assume that there is a bijection · −1 on atomic messages which maps every public (private) key k to its corresponding private (public) key k −1 . We assume that Σ contains special constant Sec (a secret). We will sometimes omit ·, · , and write, for instance, {t,
of rules, where, for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have r i , s i ∈ T (Σ, V ), for a set of variables V , and every variable in s i occurs in r 1 , . . . , r i . By |Π| we denote the number of rules of Π (i.e. the length of the sequence Π). A rule (r → s) is intended to specify receive-send action of a principal who after receiving rθ, for a ground substitution θ, replies sθ. A protocol is a finite set of principals. This method of representing principals and protocols follows [13, 3, 2] , where examples of modeling protocols in this framework can be found. The set of variables occurring in a protocol P will be denoted by Var(P ).
In the Dolev-Yao model [5] , the intruder has the entire control over the network. He can intercept and memorize messages, generate new messages and send them to participants with a false identity. We express the ability of the intruder to generate (derive) new messages from a given set of messages by the program T I in Figure 1 , where the predicate symbol I is intended to describe the intruder knowledge. The rules (1) express his ability to construct new messages by pairing known messages, and by deconstructing them. The rules (2) and (3) express his ability to crypt and decrypt messages, when he has appropriate keys. For a set A of messages, let I(A) = {I(t) | t ∈ A}. We will say that the intruder can derive a message t from messages A,
Now we give a definition of an attack for a bounded number of sessions. In an attack, the intruder chooses some execution order of the rules of the given protocol and then produces input messages for these rules. These input messages have to be derived from the intruder's initial knowledge and the output messages obtained so far. The aim of the intruder is to derive the secret message Sec . Note that in this definition of an attack, only security (or more precisely secrecy) is the concern. We do not study here properties like for instance authentication or liveness. If some number of interleaving sessions of a protocol is to be analyzed, then these sessions have to be encoded into the protocol, which is the standard approach when protocols are analyzed w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions (see, for instance [13, 2] ).
Formally, given a protocol P = {Π 1 , . . . , Π l }, a protocol execution scheme is a sequence of rules π = π 1 , . . . , π n such that each element of π can be assigned to one of the participants Π 1 , . . . , Π l , and, for each participant Π k (k = 1, . . . , l), the subsequence of the elements of π assigned to Π k is Π 1 An attack with an initial knowledge A 0 is a pair (π, σ), where π is a protocol execution scheme, and σ is a ground substitution such that, for all i = 1, . . . , n, we have
A protocol is insecure, if there exists an attack on it.
Finite tree automata. We will express finite tree automata by means of unary logic programs. We say that a logic program T with a set of accepting predicate symbols Q F is an alternating finite tree automaton, if each rule of T has the form
where x 1 , . . . , x n are distinct variables, and for each i = 1, . . . , m, the variable
A program is a nondeterministic finite tree automaton, if each its rule has the form
where x 1 , . . . , x n are distinct variables. A program T is a deterministic bottomup finite tree automaton, if each its rule has the form (7), and for each function symbol f and each sequence of predicate symbols p 1 , . . . , p n , the program contains at most one clause of the form (7). It is easy to see that, in this case, for each term t, there exists at most one predicate symbol p such that T p(t).
The set of terms accepted by (T, Q F ) will be denoted by L(T, Q F ).
Attacks with Regular Knowledge
In this section we consider the insecurity problem of protocols analyzed w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions, assuming that the initial knowledge of the intruder is a regular language given by a finite tree automaton. We assume that keys (both in symmetric and public key encryption) are atomic, which is the only assumption not made in [13] , where only keys used in public key encryption were assumed to be atomic (in other respects, the result presented here subsumes the decidability result from [13] ).
The rest of this section is devoted to prove that, when the initial knowledge of the intruder is given by a deterministic bottom-up tree automaton, then the insecurity problem is NP-complete. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, in 1 More formally, a sequence π 1 , . . . , π n of rules is a protocol execution scheme, if there is a function f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , l} such that, for each k = 1, . . . , l, assuming that integers Section 3.1, we introduce stage theories of protocols which allow us to represent attacks in more uniform way. Next, in Section 3.2, we introduce the notion of adags which are labelled term-dags suitable to represent attacks. We show that if an adag exists, then there exists an adag of polynomial size. It gives rise to the nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm for the insecurity problem.
Stage Theories
In this subsection we express the existence of an attack, using a stage theory of a protocol which takes into account the fact that A 0 is a regular language represented by a logic program (and hence A 0 and the intruder inference rules can be represented in a uniform way). Second, instead of representing the knowledge of the intruder by the predicate I, the family of predicate symbols I 0 , . . . , I m is used to represent his knowledge at different stages of an attack. Let P be a protocol, and A 0 be the initial knowledge of the intruder, represented by a finite tree automaton (T, Q F ). Let K be the set consisting of the constant Sec , and all the keys of the given protocol. We can assume without loss of generality that no rule of P have the form a → s, for a ∈ K (if it is the case, we can replace it by e.g. a, a → s, obtaining a protocols which is equivalent w.r.t. the existence of an attack). 
t. T I which uses only assumption from
Similarly, we show that (5) holds. So, we can conclude that (π, σ) is an attack. Now, suppose that we have an attack (π, σ). Let Π i be a proof of (4), for i = 1, . . . , n, and let Π n+1 be a proof of (5). We split each Π k (for k = 1, . . . , (n+1)) into the maximal (w.r.t. its length) sequence
is of the form I(a) for a ∈ K, and this occurrence of I(a) is the only one in
. . , N , let ∆ i be the sequence of facts obtained fromΠ i by substituting each I(t) by I i−1 (t), and let e i be equal to k, ifΠ i = Π m k k , for some k, and, otherwise, let e i be a, where I(a) is the last element ofΠ i . Finally, let S = {t ∈ A 0 | I(t) occurs in Π 1 , . . . , Π n+1 }, and let ∆ 0 be a proof of T e I 0 (S). One can prove that the concatenation of ∆ 0 , . . . , ∆ N is a proof of (13).
2
A proof is normal, if for each term t, it contains at most one fact of the form I k (t) (for some k). The following fact is easy to prove.
Lemma 2. It holds (13) iff there is a normal proof ∆ of
where, for each k = 1, . . . , m, we have 0 ≤ i k < k.
DAG of the Attack
Suppose that we have a protocol P , a protocol execution scheme π = (
, and a stage sequence e for π. We denote by T (P ) the set of subterms of
Suppose that the initial knowledge of the intruder is given by a deterministic bottom-up automaton (T, Q F ) with the set of predicate symbols Q, and the set of accepting predicate symbols Q F . Let Z be the set of elements of the form , and 2 We use here the assumption that no rule of P is of the form a → s, for a ∈ K. Definition 1. A dag of the attack (an adag for short) for P, e is a tuple D, α, δ 1 , δ 2 where D is a term-dag over Σ with the set of vertices V , δ 1 : V → Q, δ 2 : V → Z, and α is a mapping from T (P ) to V such that α(f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) 
The following lemma links the existence of an attack and the existence of an adag for a given protocol and stage sequence.
Lemma 3. Let P be a protocol. There exists an attack on P iff there exists a stage sequence e and an adag for P, e.
Proof. Suppose that there is an attack (π, σ). By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, there is a sequence e, and a normal proof ∆ of (14) . Let D be the dag representing all the terms of the form tσ, where t ∈ T (P ) (i. Now, suppose that D, α, δ 1 , δ 2 is an adag for P, e. Let σ(x) = t(α(x), D). We produce the following sequence of facts: First, we put all the fact of the form I k (t), where δ 2 (v) = I ↓ k (for some k), and t = t(v, D), in such a way that q(t) is before q (t ), if t > t . Second, we put all the facts of the form p(t), where D) , and all the facts of the form I k (t) (for some k), where
, in such a way that q(t) is before q (t ), if t < t . One can prove that this sequence is a normal proof of (14) , which by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, implies that there exists an attack.
Lemma 3 is a crucial step of our construction, because it characterizes the existence of an attack by a structure which is defined by some local properties ((i)-(v) of Definition 1). As we will see, it allows us to minimize adags, roughly speaking, by merging vertices which are indistinguishable from the point of view of this local properties.
Let D be an adag. We say that v ∈ V is free, if v = α(t), for each t ∈ T (P ). Let δ(v)
(and so it is a push vertex), and v = α(s k ), for s k = e s i (and so we do not have to use its parents in order to ensure that (iv) of Definition 1 is met). Now, we will show that if there exists an adag (for some P, e) then there exists an adag of polynomial size. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, in Lemma 4, we minimize the number of non-push vertices. It is a simple step which resembles the proof of pumping lemma for regular (tree) languages. In the second step (Lemma 5), we show how to minimize the number of push vertices. To explain this step, it is convenient to think that Item (iv) of Definition 1 allows us to transfer labels of the form I ↓ k down the adag, so that it can be used by pop vertices (Item (iii) ). Now, roughly speaking, if a number of pop vertices is polynomially bounded, then a polynomially bonded number of push vertices is sufficient to transfer the necessary information from top vertices to pop-vertices (which is expressed by the pushing relation in the proof of Lemma 5).
Lemma 4. If there is an adag D, then there is an adag D with the same number of push vertices, and with the set of non-push free vertices of the size at most c = m · (2n + 1), where n is the length of e, and m is the number of predicate symbols of T .

Proof. Let v, v be free non-push vertices of D with δ(v) = δ(v ). We can assume that v < v (if it is not the case, we can switch them). Let us remove v and replace it by v (i.e. whenever v was a child of u, we make v a child of u instead).
One can show that in this way we obtain an adag. We repeat this step until there are no two distinct free non-push vertices with the same value of δ. 
Now, we perform the following changes in D . Let us set δ 2 to in each free push vertex v such that G(v) = ∅. One can show that in this way we obtain an adag Next, suppose that v, v are distinct free vertices such that
We assume the former case. Let us remove v and replace it by v , and put h(v ) = h(v). Let δ 2 (u) be set to in each push vertex u such that v → * h u, and v → * h u. One can prove that what we have obtained is an adag Note that no vertex from W has been removed, and moreover, for v ∈ W , the value of δ(v) has not been changed.
We repeat this step until there are no two distinct free push vertices v, v with δ(v) = δ(v ) and G(v) = G(v ). Note that each time we modify the adag we modify also its pushing relation. Let D be the adag obtained in this way, and let → h be its pushing relation. Because W is polynomial, T h is polynomial as well: this forest has at most |W | leafs (each leaf is an element of W ), and each its path is not longer than |W | · c (note that c is the number of distinct values of δ, and |W | is the maximal number of distinct values of the function G on each path). Each push vertex of D is in T h , so the number of push vertices in D is polynomial. Let us apply Lemma 4 to D obtaining D * . The number of push vertices is unchanged, and the number of free non-push vertices is polynomial. Thus D * has polynomial size.
Theorem 1. Protocol insecurity for a bounded number of sessions, with the initial knowledge of the intruder given by a deterministic bottom-up tree automaton is NP-complete.
Proof. For deciding a protocol, we guess a protocol execution scheme, a sequence e for it, then we guess an adag of polynomial size (verifying whether such a guessed structure is an adag can be easily done in polynomial time). NPhardness follows from NP-hardness of deciding protocols without composed keys, with the initial knowledge of the intruder given as a finite set [13] .
Protocols with Regular Constraints
Definition 2. A protocol with regular constraints is a tuple (P, D), where P is a protocol, and D is a domain assignment which assigns a regular language D x (the domain of x) to each variable x ∈ Var(P ). For a protocol with regular constraint (P, D), a pair (π, σ) is an attack on (P, D), if it is an attack on P , and furthermore, for each x ∈ Var(P ), we have xσ ∈ D x .
We consider the problem of deciding protocols with regular constraints, where both the initial knowledge of the intruder, and languages D x are given by finite tree automata. As we will see the choice of the type of automata (deterministic, nondeterministic, alternating) does not have any impact on the complexity of the problem: in all these cases the problem turns out to be NexpTime-complete. (P, D) , where the initial knowledge of the intruder and the languages D x , for x ∈ Var(P ), are given by alternating tree automata can be reduced to the problem of deciding a protocol (without constraints) with a regular initial knowledge of the intruder given by an alternating automaton.
Proposition 1. The problem of deciding a protocol with constraints
Proof. Suppose that (P, D) is a protocol with regular constraints, and that
be alternating tree automata which describe the initial knowledge of the intruder and the languages D x i , respectively. We assume that these automata have disjoint sets of states, and that the accepting state of A i is q i (for 0 ≤ i ≤ m). Let A denote the union of A 0 , . . . , A m with the accepting state q 0 (recall that it is the accepting state of A 0 ).
Let P be the protocol P with one additional principal having the only rule It is known that, for an alternating tree automaton, one can construct an equivalent deterministic bottom-up tree automaton of exponential size. Hence, Proposition 1, and Theorem 1 have the following consequence.
Theorem 2. The insecurity of a protocol (P, D) with the initial knowledge of the intruder and the languages D x given by alternating tree automata is in NexpTime.
One can show that the exponential bounded tiling problem (which is NexpTime-hard) can be reduced to the problem of deciding a protocol with regular constraints which use deterministic automata only. Thus we have the following result (the proof is the appendix). Let us note that the reduction given in the proof of Proposition 1 has the following property: if the initial knowledge of the intruder and the languages D x are given by nondeterministic (but not alternating) tree automata, then the resulting automaton A is also nondeterministic (does not use alternations). We can use this fact and Theorem 3 to obtain the following result, which shows that the assumption about the determinism of the automaton in Theorem 1 is essential.
Corollary 1. The insecurity problem of protocols (without constraints) with the initial intruder knowledge given by nondeterministic tree automata is
NexpTimehard.
Regular protocols
The aim of this section is to specify a (possibly general) class of protocols such that each protocol P in this class has the following property: the knowledge which the intruder can gain during an unbounded number of sessions of P is a regular language. The class defined here is closely related to regular unary-predicate programs defined in [8] , and to a class of monadic Horn theories defined in [14] .
In this section we consider the analysis w.r.t. unbounded number of sessions. We should note that in this case, the formalism used do describe protocols does not model nonces (in the case of a bounded number of sessions nonces can be modeled by constants). Hence, we can assume without loss of generality, that a protocol is just a set of (independent) rules 3 , and that each of its rules r → s says that if the intruder knows a term rθ, than it can also know sθ, for any ground substitution θ.
for some f ∈ Σ, and each occurrence of x in t is in the context of one of s 1 , . . . , s n .
Note also that any term covers x in {y} a .
Definition 4.
Let ϕ be the function, which assigns a set of terms to a term, defined by the equations ϕ(t) = ϕ(t 1 ) ∪ ϕ(t 2 ), if t = t 1 , t 2 , and ϕ(t) = {t}, otherwise.
Definition 5. A rule r → s is regular, if for each s ∈ ϕ(s) the following conditions hold: s is linear, and each term r ∈ ϕ(r) can be assign a subterm γ s (r ) of s , such that:
(i) for each r ∈ ϕ(r) and each x ∈ Var(s ), the term γ s (r ) covers x in r , (ii) for each r , r ∈ ϕ(r), if a variable y / ∈ Var(s ) occurs in both r and r , then γ s (r ) = γ s (r ).
A protocol is regular, if it consists of regular rules only.
is regular. In fact, for γ s (r) = x, the conditions of Definition 5 hold (it is because x covers x in any term, and Var(s) = {x}; note also that ϕ(r) = {r} and ϕ(s) = {s}). Similarly, one can easily check that each rule which has only one occurrence of a variable on the right-hand side, is regular. 3 If it is not the case, each principal {ri → si} n i=1 can be transformed to n principals with rules r 1 , . . . , r i → s i , for each i = 1, . . . , n. It is easy to check that this transformation is correct in the following sense: the sets of messages the intruder can gain during an unbounded number of sessions of the original protocol and the protocol after the transformation are the same. The proof is given in the appendix.
Theorem 5. Secrecy of a regular protocol is DexpTime-complete.
Proof. To decide a secrecy of a regular protocol, we build (in exponential time) an alternating tree automaton A of polynomial number of states which describes the knowledge of the intruder, and check whether Sec ∈ L(A), which can be done in exponential time.
We prove DexpTime-hardness by reduction of the emptiness of the intersection of regular tree languages given by n finite automata. We build a protocol that encode all these automata in such a way that the i-th automaton recognizes a term t iff the intruder knows the term {t} k i . We add the rule {x} k 1 , . . . , {x} k n → Sec to the protocol. One can see that the protocol is insecure, iff the intersection of the given automata is not empty.
By a very similar technique, regular protocols can be extended to work with regular constraints: we can encode a finite state automaton A by some regular rules so that t ∈ L(A) iff I({t} k A ), and add terms of the form {x} k A to the left-hand side of rules.
The results of this section and Sections 3 can be easily combined to achieve decidability of secrecy of the following two-phases protocols. Suppose that a protocol, which uses only atomic keys, consists of some regular rules P 1 , and some rules P 2 of arbitrary form. The intruder can execute rules from P 1 unbounded number of times (building a knowledge which is a regular language), and then he can execute the rules of P 2 at most once. Because, for an alternating tree automaton, one can construct an equivalent deterministic bottom-up tree automaton of exponential size, by Theorems 4 and 1, the insecurity problem of such a protocol can be decided in NexpTime.
Conclusions
We have extended the decidability result for protocols analyzed w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions to the case when the initial knowledge of the intruder is a regular language. We have shown that if this language is given by a deterministic bottom-up automaton, then the insecurity problem of a protocol is NP-complete, assuming that complex keys are not allowed. We have showed also that if we add to protocols regular constraints which guarantee that messages have a required form, then the problem of deciding protocols is NexpTime-complete. These results can be a starting point for developing practical algorithms for detecting attacks with regular initial knowledge.
We have also defined a family of protocols such that the set of messages that the intruder can gain during unbounded number of sessions is exactly a regular language.
An open problem is decidability of the security of protocols with complex keys against attacks with regular initial knowledge.
(a) for each 0 ≤ i, j < 2 m the term t has exactly one subtree of the form
Let Σ E be the set of function symbols used in L E (clearly Σ 0 ⊆ Σ E ). Similarly, one can effectively construct a family A of deterministic bottom-up tree automata such that the language L A of trees accepted by all these automata (1) has the same property like L E , and moreover (2) Similarly, we define families of automata B, C and D in such a way that
Moreover, we assume that Σ E , Σ A , Σ B , Σ C , and Σ D do not share function symbols except for the symbols from
Let the initial knowledge of the intruder consists of the set {{t} l | t ∈ T (Σ)}, and all the keys from Σ except for l and k. Let the following protocol be the result of the reduction.
with constraints
Note that, since the construction of the families E, A, B, C, D is effective, then the whole construction is effective. Now, one can prove that, for each successful attack with a substitution σ, we have:
1. The rule (16) must be used, and before it is used the terms 4 have the same value. Let us denote this value by u i,j . The properties of the languages L A , . . . , L E imply that the function t(i, j) = u i,j is a solution of the given tiling problem.
One can also show that, if there exists a solution of the given tiling problem, then there exists an attack on the defined protocol.
B Proof of Theorem 4
A regular protocol can be easily translated to a logic program: for each rule r → s, we produce clauses of the form I(s ) ← I(ϕ(r)), where s ∈ ϕ(s). Suppose that T is a logic program obtained in this way from a given regular protocol. Let T = T ∪ T I . One can show that the knowledge that the intruder can gain during the protocol execution is the interpretation of I in the least Herbrand model of T . Moreover one can show that each clause s ← r 1 . . . r n of T meets the following conditions: s is linear, and each term r i (for i = 1, . . . , n) can be assign a subterm γ(r i ) of s, such that: (i) for each i = 1, . . . , n, and each x ∈ Var(s), the term γ(r i ) covers x in r i , (ii) for each i, j = 1, . . . , n, if a variable y / ∈ Var(s) occurs in both r i and r j , then γ(r i ) = γ(r j ). We will call clauses of this form regular. Proof. First, we can eliminate clauses with the head of the form p(x) (we assume that we have a fixed signature). Now, suppose that a clause has the form p( s 1 , s 2 ) ← p 1 (t 1 ), . . . , p n (t n ) (for other function symbols the proof proceeds similarly). Let γ be as in the definition of regular clauses. We divide the literals p 1 (t 1 ), . . . , p n (t n ) into three groups A, B, C such that p(t i ) ∈ A iff γ(t i ) = s 1 , s 2 , t i ∈ B iff γ(t i ) ≤ s 1 , and t i ∈ C iff γ(t i ) ≤ s 2 . We remove the rule, and add the following ones: We say that a clause of the form (17) is basic, if each t i is a variable. We say that a clause of the form (17) is a pop-clause, if each t i is a variable from {x 1 , . . . , x n }.
Let P be the regular program obtained from T using Lemma 6 (so, all its clauses are of the form (17)), and C = (l 0 ← l 1 , . . . , l n ) be a (non-basic) clause. We write C −→ P C , if we can obtain C as a result of resolution of C and some basic clause of P , i.e. if l i = q (f (r 1 , . . . , r k )) (for some i), q(f (y 1 , . . . , y k )) ← B is a variant with fresh variables of a basic clause of P , and Let P be the least set of clauses such that P ⊆ P , and if C ∈ P and C −→ * P C , for some basic clause C , then C ∈ P (−→ * P is the transitive closure of −→ P ). 
where p 0 , . . . , p m are predicate symbols from P . There are only exponentially many distinct clauses of this form (up to variable renaming).
Note, that the set of predicate symbols in P remains unchanged. Let P * denotes the program obtained from P by removing all the non basic rules.
Lemma 8. P * is equivalent to P .
Proof. First, notice that each clause in P * either is in P , or is a logical consequence of P . Thus, if P * p(t), then P p(t). One can also show, by induction on the structure of proof, that if P p(t), for some ground term t, then P * p(t). 
One can eliminate literals of the form p i (y i ) where y i / ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x n }, obtaining only pop rules, in exponential time: we can construct a family E of sets of literals such that A ∈ E, iff there exists a term t such that for each p ∈ A we have P * p(t) (in order to do it we start with E = ∅ and use various combinations of rules of P * to extend E). Having computed E, for each clause of P * (which is of the form (19)), we can either remove this clause, or remove all the literals of the form p i (y i ) where y i / ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x n }. One can see that the obtained program is equivalent to P * , and moreover it consists of pop clauses only. Thus, it is just an alternating tree automaton of polynomial number of states, which concludes the proof.
